The URL syntax you observed is functional, not deceptive. In Windows Delivery Optimization (DO) and Connected Cache architecture, the cacheHostOrigin parameter is a standard routing argument used to map the requested content back to the specific Microsoft Content Delivery Network (CDN) origin, in this case, *.tlu.dl.delivery.mp.microsoft.com. This allows the external peer or ISP-hosted cache node (the IP 194.36.32.207) to retrieve and serve the correct file segment. The ampersand & is merely a standard delimiter for these query strings, not a mechanism to separate malicious payloads from legitimate ones.
Your sandbox findings are the definitive proof of legitimacy. A valid Microsoft digital signature on the downloaded binary is cryptographically impossible to spoof via URL manipulation. Windows Update clients also verify the SHA-256 hash of every file chunk against trusted metadata downloaded directly from the Windows Update Service (HTTPS) before assembly. If the content were a decoy or malicious injection from that external IP, the hash check would fail, and the OS would discard the packet immediately.
To eliminate these false positives and the reliance on external cache IPs, you must enforce the configuration previously discussed. Set Download Mode to Simple (99) in Group Policy (Computer Configuration > Administrative Templates > Windows Components > Delivery Optimization). This restricts the Windows Update agent to use only HTTP/HTTPS traffic directly from official Microsoft FQDNs, bypassing the peering logic that generates these dynamic URLs.
VP