5.3.3 Man in the Middle
In this scenario, an attacker poses as a man in the middle (MITM). For example, an MITM could be using a rogue wireless access point in a wireless-enabled enterprise environment.
The data flow in case of attack (without an SSTP crypto binding solution) looks like this:
The MITM establishes an HTTPS connection with the SSTP server.
By using some technique (such as a rogue access point (AP) that has a similar name to the enterprise network), the MITM attacker gets a real client to initiate an EAP authentication (which can be any EAP method) with an authorized SSTP server. The client cannot determine that the HTTPS channel has been established to the man-in-the-middle machine; the client attempts to authenticate to a known authorized server by using EAP authentication, as usual.
The MITM passes (or re-routes) the client's EAP-TLS authentication packets that are received over wireless to the PPP over SSTP (over SSL/TLS) tunnel it has established with the SSTP server. It does the same thing in reverse for responses to the client.
The client and the server successfully complete the EAP authentication. The MITM machine simply relays the packets back and forth between both SSL/TLS tunnels.
The MITM drops the client and continues to use the authenticated SSTP channel established with the server—without knowing the client's privileges and in an unauthorized manner.
Note The previous attack can happen for any PPP authentication protocol that can be relayed on another transport. For example, EAP can be relayed on SSTP as well as wireless.
Figure 11: MITM scenario without the SSTP crypto binding solution
To mitigate this attack, the SSTP server expects a Crypto Binding attribute from the SSTP client to be present in the Call Connected message. This attribute is generated by the client using the keys generated on the client. By using the inner (or PPP) authentication phase keys, and by tying the inner (or PPP) authentication to the outer (or SSL/TLS) authentication phase, this technique ensures that the SSTP client and the SSTP server participated in the inner authentication and terminate at the expected endpoints.
Figure 12: MITM scenario with SSTP crypto binding solution
Note Protected EAP (PEAP) (for more information, see [MS-PEAP]) can also be used as the authentication protocol. In this case, the security attack vector and the solution remain the same as EAP. PEAP has an outer TLS channel between the PEAP client and authenticating server (like radius server) and does inner EAP authentication. If a PEAP crypto Type-Length-Value (TLV) check is not enabled on the client, then the PEAP client is susceptible to PEAP MITM attacks. This protocol does not offer a solution to this attack vector, which is already solved by the PEAP crypto TLV attribute.