script-src 'self'; object-src 'self'; worker-src 'self'
The policy adds security by limiting Extensions and applications in three ways:
Code like the following doesn't work:
alert(eval("foo.bar.baz"));
window.setTimeout("alert('hi')", 10);
window.setInterval("alert('hi')", 10);
new Function("return foo.bar.baz");
Evaluating strings of JavaScript like this is a common XSS attack vector. Instead, you should write code like:
alert(foo && foo.bar && foo.bar.baz);
window.setTimeout(function() { alert('hi'); }, 10);
window.setInterval(function() { alert('hi'); }, 10);
function() { return foo && foo.bar && foo.bar.baz };
Inline JavaScript aren't run
Inline JavaScript aren't run. This restriction bans both inline <script> blocks and inline event handlers, such as <button onclick="...">.
The first restriction wipes out a huge class of cross-site scripting attacks by making it impossible for you to accidentally run the script provided by a malicious third-party. It does, however, require you to write your code with a clean separation between content and behavior. An example might make this clearer. You could try to write a Browser Action pop-up as a single pop-up.html containing the following:
<!doctype html>
<html>
<head>
<title>My Awesome Pop-up!</title>
<script>
function awesome() {
// do something awesome!
}
function totallyAwesome() {
// do something TOTALLY awesome!
}
function clickHandler(element) {
setTimeout("awesome(); totallyAwesome()", 1000);
}
function main() {
// Initialization work goes here.
}
</script>
</head>
<body onload="main();">
<button onclick="clickHandler(this)">
Click for awesomeness!
</button>
</body>
</html>
But three things must change in order to make this work the way you expect it to:
The clickHandler definition must be moved into an external JavaScript file (popup.js may be a good target).
The inline event handler definitions must be rewritten in terms of addEventListener and extracted into popup.js. If you're currently starting your program using code like <body onload="main();">, consider replacing it by hooking into the DOMContentLoaded event of the document, or the load event of the window, depending on your requirements. Use the former, since it generally triggers more quickly.
The setTimeout call must be rewritten to avoid converting the string "awesome(); totallyAwesome()" into JavaScript for running.
Those changes could look something like the following:
function awesome() {
// Do something awesome!
}
function totallyAwesome() {
// do something TOTALLY awesome!
}
function awesomeTask() {
awesome();
totallyAwesome();
}
function clickHandler(e) {
setTimeout(awesomeTask, 1000);
}
function main() {
// Initialization work goes here.
}
// Add event listeners once the DOM has fully loaded by listening for the
// `DOMContentLoaded` event on the document, and adding your listeners to
// specific elements when it triggers.
document.addEventListener('DOMContentLoaded', function () {
document.querySelector('button').addEventListener('click', clickHandler);
main();
});
<!doctype html>
<html>
<head>
<title>My Awesome Pop-up!</title>
<script src="popup.js"></script>
</head>
<body>
<button>Click for awesomeness!</button>
</body>
</html>
Only local script and object resources are loaded
Script and object resources are only able to be loaded from the Extension package, not from the web at large. This ensures that your Extension only runs the code you specifically approved, preventing an active network attacker from maliciously redirecting your request for a resource.
Instead of writing code that depends on jQuery (or any other library) loading from an external CDN, consider including the specific version of jQuery in your Extension package. That is, instead of:
<!doctype html>
<html>
<head>
<title>My Awesome Pop-up!</title>
<script src="https://ajax.googleapis.com/ajax/libs/jquery/1.7.1/jquery.min.js"></script>
</head>
<body>
<button>Click for awesomeness!</button>
</body>
</html>
Use the following approach instead. Download the file, include it in your package, and write:
<!doctype html>
<html>
<head>
<title>My Awesome Pop-up!</title>
<script src="jquery.min.js"></script>
</head>
<body>
<button>Click for awesomeness!</button>
</body>
</html>
Relaxing the default policy
Inline Script
Inline scripts can be allowed by specifying the base64-encoded hash of the source code in the policy. This hash must be prefixed by the used hash algorithm (sha256, sha384 or sha512). For an example, see W3C > Hash usage for <script> elements.
Remote Script
If you require some external JavaScript or object resources, you can relax the policy to a limited extent by allowlisting secure origins from which scripts should be accepted. Verify that runtime resources loaded with with elevated permissions of an Extension are exactly the resources you expect, and aren't replaced by an active network attacker. As man-in-the-middle attacks are both trivial and undetectable over HTTP, those origins aren't accepted.
Currently, you can allowlist origins that have the following schemes: blob, filesystem, https, and extension. The host part of the origin must explicitly be specified for the https and extension schemes. Generic wildcards such as https:, https://* and https://*.com aren't allowed; subdomain wildcards such as https://*.example.com are allowed. Domains in the Public Suffix list are also viewed as generic top-level domains. To load a resource from these domains, the subdomain must explicitly be listed. For example, https://*.cloudfront.net is not valid, but https://XXXX.cloudfront.net and https://*.XXXX.cloudfront.net can be allowlisted.
For development ease, resources loaded over HTTP from servers on your local machine can be allowlisted. You can allowlist script and object sources on any port of either http://127.0.0.1 or http://localhost.
Note
The restriction against resources loaded over HTTP applies only to those resources which are directly run. You are still free, for example, to make XMLHTTPRequest connections to any origin you like; the default policy doesn't restrict connect-src or any of the other CSP directives in any way.
A relaxed policy definition which allows script resources to be loaded from example.com over HTTPS may look like:
"content_security_policy": "script-src 'self' https://example.com; object-src 'self'"
Note
Both script-src and object-src are defined by the policy. Microsoft Edge doesn't accept a policy that doesn't limit each of these values to (at least) 'self'.
Evaluated JavaScript
The policy against eval() and related functions like setTimeout(String), setInterval(String), and new Function(String) can be relaxed by adding unsafe-eval to your policy:
"content_security_policy": "script-src 'self' 'unsafe-eval'; object-src 'self'"
However, you should avoid relaxing policies. These types of functions are notorious XSS attack vectors.
Tightening the default policy
You can tighten this policy to whatever extent your Extension allows, in order to increase security, at the expense of convenience. To specify that your Extension can only load resources of any type (images, and so on) from the associated Extension package, for example, a policy of default-src 'self' might be appropriate.
Content Scripts
The policy being discussing applies to the background pages and event pages of the Extension. How the content scripts apply to the content scripts of the Extension is more complicated.
Content scripts are generally not subject to the CSP of the Extension. Since content scripts aren't HTML, the main impact of this is that they can use eval even if the CSP of the Extension doesn't specify unsafe-eval, although this is not recommended. Additionally, the CSP of the page doesn't apply to content scripts. More complicated are <script> tags that content scripts create and put into the DOM of the page they are running on. These are referenced as DOM injected scripts going forward.
DOM injected scripts that run immediately upon injection into the page run as you would expect. Imagine a content script with the following code as a simple example:
document.write("<script>alert(1);</script>");
This content script causes an alert immediately upon the document.write(). Note that this runs regardless of the policy a page specifies. However, the behavior becomes more complicated both inside that DOM injected script and for any script that doesn't immediately run upon injection.
Imagine that your Extension is running on a page that provides an associated CSP that specifies script-src 'self'. Now imagine the content script runs the following code:
document.write("<button onclick='alert(1);'>click me</button>'");
If a user clicks that button, the onclick script doesn't run. This is because the script didn't immediately run, and code that isn't interpreted until the click event occurs isn't considered part of the content script, so the CSP of the page (not of the Extension) restricts the behavior. And since that CSP doesn't specify unsafe-inline, the inline event handler is blocked.
The correct way to implement the desired behavior in this case is to add the onclick handler as a function from the content script, as follows:
document.write("<button id='mybutton'>click me</button>'");
var button = document.getElementById('mybutton');
button.onclick = function() {
alert(1);
};
Another similar issue arises if the content script runs the following:
var script = document.createElement('script');
script.innerHTML = 'alert(1);'
document.getElementById('body').appendChild(script);
In this case, the script runs, and the alert appears. However, consider this case:
var script = document.createElement('script');
script.innerHTML = 'eval("alert(1);")';
=document.getElementById('body').appendChild(script);
While the initial script runs, the call to eval is blocked. That is, while the initial script runtime is allowed, the behavior within the script is regulated by the CSP of the page. Thus, depending on how you write DOM injected scripts in your Extension, changes to the CSP of the page might affect the behavior of your Extension.
Since content scripts aren't affected by the CSP of the page, this a great reason to put as much behavior as possible of your Extension into the content script, rather than DOM injected scripts.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.