It works this way:
An attacker who gets his hand on your disk would try to use passwords lists and/or brute forcing. If you use a "good" password (let it be 15 characters long), it would fall in maybe far less than a year depending on the computing powers the attacker has access to.
However, if you use the TPM alone (no PIN), the attacker would have no password (or PIN) to run these brute forcing attacks against. He would have to attack the key itself, which is very very long (no chance for brute forcing).
If you use Bitlocker with TPM+PIN, the situation is almost the same: the attacker can however try to guess your PIN. The PIN by default is at least 6 digits long which does not seem to be safe, but in fact, it is, since there is a limitation to the number of tries: the TPM locks after 32 incorrect attempts - locks for good. With a locked TPM, the attacker would be left with the chance to brute-force the recovery password. The recovery poassword is not set by the user, but by windows and it's long: 48 digits. The chance to brute force this in the next few years (no matter what computing powers the attacker has) are zero.
About conspiracy: there are people that don't trust the TPM technology itself. They say, Intel (makers of the TPM of many models) wants access to the keys in order to sell them to the FBI and such wild ideas.