The link below is to a postponement form for this new requirement. Importantly, it spells out exactly how this will work and provides links to tools to understand where you may have gaps in your environment:
https://aka.ms/managemfaforazure
It was not until we reviewed this that we fully understood exactly how this is going to work. Keep in mind the enforcement date is on or after 10/15/2024. As of this writing, I was still able to access the Azure and Entra admin portals using our break glass account authenticating with only a password, so this does not appear to be fully in effect for all tenants.
You should carefully review the (now updated) Microsoft guidance on managing emergency access. It suggests both that at least one emergency access account should be excluded from all CA policies and that these policies will be overridden when accessing certain admin portals (MFA will be required). These two things don't necessarily contradict each other (you'll need MFA to access some admin portals, but your break glass account won't be dependent on your Conditional Access architecture), but I can understand why people are so confused by this.
Here's how we've decided to handle this, for what it's worth:
- Our break glass account is excluded from all MFA policies.
- The account has a very long passphrase stored in separate parts and in secure locations per Microsoft's guidance.
- We set up multiple FIDO2 keys, which are stored in secure locations. We will try to use these keys to log in to the break glass account and only fall back to the password if necessary.
- We test both authentication methods for the account every 90 days.
- We have Azure alerts set up to notify all admins whenever the account is used via email and text message.