Unfortunanly I side with your detractors on this topic.
The password update page cannot be conditionned to pre-authentication in any supported way.
And even if we could, I don't agree that it would bring a significant value. I am not saying there are no risks, but those risks should be addressed by triggering MFA for the applications the user can access to using ADFS. That way, even if a malcious user would do what you described (which by the way is really a corner case scenario as it generates a ton of logs - granted not everyone looks a the logs), it would not give the attacker an advantage as MFA will have to be performed to access applications.
Your problem is not the password update page. Your problem is passwords.
And for that we have alternative solutions (which are not using passwords...). Such as Windows Hello for Business, Azure MFA as a first factor for authentication or certificate based authentication (for the built-in one, but that's extendable with third party MFA that could also be used as a first logon for authentication with ADFS on Windows Server 2019).