Common questions about Windows Hello for Business

Windows Hello represents the biometric framework provided in Windows. Windows Hello lets users use biometrics to sign in to their devices by securely storing their user name and password and releasing it for authentication when the user successfully identifies themselves using biometrics. Windows Hello for Business uses asymmetric keys protected by the device's security module that requires a user gesture (PIN or biometrics) to authenticate.

When using Windows Hello for Business, the PIN isn't a symmetric key, whereas the password is a symmetric key. With passwords, there's a server that has some representation of the password. With Windows Hello for Business, the PIN is user-provided entropy used to load the private key in the Trusted Platform Module (TPM). The server doesn't have a copy of the PIN. For that matter, the Windows client doesn't have a copy of the current PIN either. The user must provide the entropy, the TPM-protected key, and the TPM that generated that key in order to successfully access the private key. The statement "PIN is stronger than Password" is not directed at the strength of the entropy used by the PIN. It's about the difference between providing entropy versus continuing the use of a symmetric key (the password). The TPM has anti-hammering features that thwart brute-force PIN attacks (an attacker's continuous attempt to try all combination of PINs). Some organizations may worry about shoulder surfing. For those organizations, rather than increase the complexity of the PIN, implement the Multifactor Unlock feature.

When a user wants to access protected key material, the authentication process begins with the user entering a PIN or biometric gesture to unlock the device, a process sometimes called releasing the key. Think of it like using a physical key to unlock a door: before you can unlock the door, you need to remove the key from your pocket or purse. The user's PIN unlocks the protector key for the container on the device. When that container is unlocked, applications (and thus the user) can use whatever IDP keys reside inside the container. These keys are used to sign requests that are sent to the IDP, requesting access to specified resources. It's important to understand that although the keys are unlocked, applications cannot use them at will. Applications can use specific APIs to request operations that require key material for particular actions (for example, decrypt an email message or sign in to a website). Access through these APIs doesn't require explicit validation through a user gesture, and the key material isn't exposed to the requesting application. Rather, the application asks for authentication, encryption, or decryption, and the Windows Hello layer handles the actual work and returns the results. Where appropriate, an application can request a forced authentication even on an unlocked device. Windows prompts the user to reenter the PIN or perform an authentication gesture, which adds an extra level of protection for sensitive data or actions. For example, you can configure an application to require re-authentication anytime a specific operation is performed, even though the same account and PIN or gesture were already used to unlock the device. For more information about the different authentication flows used by Windows Hello for Business, see Windows Hello for Business and Authentication.

Windows Hello generates a new public-private key pair on the device. The TPM generates and protects this private key; if the device doesn't have a TPM, the private key is encrypted and stored in software. This initial key is referred to as the protector key. It's associated only with a single gesture; in other words, if a user registers a PIN, a fingerprint, and a face on the same device, each of those gestures will have a unique protector key. Each unique gesture generates a unique protector key. The protector key securely wraps the authentication key. The container has only one authentication key, but there can be multiple copies of that key wrapped with different unique protector keys. Windows Hello also generates an administrative key that the user or administrator can use to reset credentials, when necessary (for example, when using the PIN reset service). In addition to the protector key, TPM-enabled devices generate a block of data that contains attestations from the TPM. At this point, the user has a PIN gesture defined on the device and an associated protector key for that PIN gesture. That means the user is able to securely sign in to the device with the PIN and thus be able to establish a trusted session with the device to add support for a biometric gesture as an alternative for the PIN. When you add a biometric gesture, it follows the same basic sequence: the user authenticates to the system by using the PIN, and then registers the new biometric, after which Windows generates a unique key pair and stores it securely. Future sign-ins can then use either the PIN or the registered biometric gestures.

In the context of Windows Hello for Business, a container is a logical grouping of key material or data. Windows Hello uses a single container that holds user key material for personal accounts, including key material associated with the user's Microsoft account or with other consumer identity providers, and credentials associated with a workplace or school account. The container holds enterprise credentials only on devices that have been registered with an organization; it contains key material for the enterprise IDP, such as on-premises Active Directory or Azure AD.

The container contains a set of keys, some of which are used to protect other keys. The following image shows an example: the protector key is used to encrypt the authentication key, and the authentication key is used to encrypt the individual keys stored in the container. Each logical container holds one or more sets of keys.

Containers can contain several types of key material:

• An authentication key, which is always an asymmetric public-private key pair. This key pair is generated during registration. It must be unlocked each time it's accessed, by using either the user's PIN or a biometric gesture. The authentication key exists until the user resets the PIN, at which time a new key will be generated. When the new key is generated, all the key material that the old key previously protected must be decrypted and re-encrypted using the new key.
• The IDP key. These keys can be either symmetric or asymmetric, depending on which IDP you use. A single container may contain zero or more IDP keys, with some restrictions (for example, the enterprise container can contain zero or one IDP key). IDP keys are stored in the container. For certificate-based Windows Hello for Work, when the container is unlocked, applications that require access to the IDP key or key pair can request access. IDP keys are used to sign or encrypt authentication requests or tokens sent from this device to the IDP. IDP keys are typically long-lived but could have a shorter lifetime than the authentication key. Microsoft accounts, Active Directory accounts, and Azure AD accounts all require the use of asymmetric key pairs. The device generates public and private keys, registers the public key with the IDP (which stores it for later verification), and securely stores the private key. For enterprises, the IDP keys can be generated in two ways:
  • The IDP key pair can be associated with an enterprise Certificate Authority (CA) through the Windows Network Device Enrollment Service (NDES). In this case, Windows Hello requests a new certificate with the same key as the certificate from the existing PKI. This option lets organizations that have an existing PKI continue to use it where appropriate. Given that many applications, such as VPN solutions, require the use of certificates, when you deploy Windows Hello in this mode, it allows a faster transition away from user passwords while still preserving certificate-based functionality. This option also allows the enterprise to store additional certificates in the protected container.
  • The IDP can generate the IDP key pair directly, which allows quick, lower-overhead deployment of Windows Hello in environments that don't have or need a PKI.

Anytime key material is generated, it must be protected against attack. The most robust way to do this is through specialized hardware. There's a long history of using hardware security modules (HSMs) to generate, store, and process keys for security-critical applications. Smart cards are a special type of HSM, as are devices that are compliant with the Trusted Computing Group TPM standard. Wherever possible, the Windows Hello for Business implementation takes advantage of onboard TPM hardware to generate and protect keys. Administrators can choose to allow key operations in software, but it's recommended the use of TPM hardware. The TPM protects against a variety of known and potential attacks, including PIN brute-force attacks. The TPM provides an additional layer of protection after an account lockout, too. When the TPM has locked the key material, the user will have to reset the PIN (which means the user will have to use MFA to reauthenticate to the IDP before the IDP allows re-registration). Resetting the PIN means that all keys and certificates encrypted with the old key material will be removed.

Windows Hello for Business provides a PIN caching user experience by using a ticketing system. Rather than caching a PIN, processes cache a ticket they can use to request private key operations. Azure AD and Active Directory sign-in keys are cached under lock. This means the keys remain available for use without prompting, as long as the user is interactively signed-in. Microsoft Account sign-in keys are transactional keys, which means the user is always prompted when accessing the key.

Beginning with Windows 10, version 1709, Windows Hello for Business used as a smart card (smart card emulation that is enabled by default) provides the same user experience of default smart card PIN caching. Each process requesting a private key operation will prompt the user for the PIN on first use. Subsequent private key operations won't prompt the user for the PIN.

The smart card emulation feature of Windows Hello for Business verifies the PIN and then discards the PIN in exchange for a ticket. The process doesn't receive the PIN, but rather the ticket that grants them private key operations. Windows 10 doesn't provide any Group Policy settings to adjust this caching.

When you enroll in Windows Hello, a representation of your biometrics, called an enrollment profile, is created more information can be found on Windows Hello face authentication. This enrollment profile biometrics data is device specific, is stored locally on the device, and does not leave the device or roam with the user. Some external fingerprint sensors store biometric data on the fingerprint module itself rather than on Windows device. Even in this case, the biometrics data is stored locally on those modules, is device specific, doesn't roam, never leaves the module, and is never sent to Microsoft cloud or external server. For more details, see Windows Hello biometrics in the enterprise.

Windows Hello biometrics data is stored on the device as an encrypted template database. The data from the biometrics sensor (like face camera or fingerprint reader) creates a data representation—or graph—that is then encrypted before it's stored on the device. Each biometrics sensor on the device which is used by Windows Hello (face or fingerprint) will have its own biometric database file where template data is stored. Each biometrics database file is encrypted with unique, randomly generated key that is encrypted to the system using AES encryption producing an SHA256 hash.

Since Windows Hello biometrics data is stored in encrypted format, no user, or any process other than Windows Hello has access to it.

Windows Hello for Business has two types of PIN reset: non-destructive and destructive. Organizations running Windows 10 version 1903 and later and Azure Active Directory can take advantage of the Microsoft PIN Reset service. Once on-boarded to a tenant and deployed to computers, users who have forgotten their PINs can authenticate to Azure, provide a second factor of authentication, and reset their PIN without reprovisioning a new Windows Hello for Business enrollment. This flow is a non-destructive PIN reset because the user doesn't delete the current credential and obtain a new one. For more information, see PIN Reset.

Organizations that have the on-premises deployment of Windows Hello for Business, or those not using Windows 10 version 1903 and later can use destructive PIN reset. With destructive PIN reset, users that have forgotten their PIN can authenticate by using their password and then performing a second factor of authentication to reprovision their Windows Hello for Business credential. Reprovisioning deletes the old credential and requests a new credential and certificate. On-premises deployments need network connectivity to their domain controllers, Active Directory Federation Services, and their issuing certificate authority to perform a destructive PIN reset. For hybrid Azure Active Directory joined devices, destructive PIN reset is only supported with the certificate trust model and the latest updates to Active Directory Federation Services.

Windows Hello biometrics template database file is created on the device only when a user is enrolled into Windows Hello biometrics-based authentication. Your workplace or IT administrator may have turned certain authentication functionality, however, it is always your choice if you want to use Windows Hello or an alternative method, like a PIN. Users can check their current enrollment into Windows Hello biometrics by going to sign-in options on their device. Go to Start > Settings > Accounts > Sign-in options. If you don't see Windows Hello in Sign-in options, then it may not be available for your device or blocked by admin via policy. Admins can request users to enroll into Windows Hello during Autopilot or during the initial setup of the device. Admins can disallow users to enroll into biometrics via Windows Hello for Business policy configurations. However, when allowed via policy configurations, enrollment into Windows Hello biometrics is always optional for users.

To remove Windows Hello and any associated biometric identification data from the device, user can go to Start > Settings > Accounts > Sign-in options. Select the Windows Hello biometrics authentication method you want to remove, and then select Remove. This will u-enroll the user from Windows Hello biometrics authentication and will also delete the associated biometrics template database file. For more details, see Windows sign-in options and account protection (microsoft.com).

Yes, hybrid and cloud-only Windows Hello for Business deployments can use Microsoft Intune. For more information, see Integrate Windows Hello for Business with Microsoft Intune.

Starting in Configuration Manager, version 2203, Windows Hello for Business deployments using Configuration Manager are no longer supported.

You can effectively disable Windows Hello for Business by launching certutil.exe -deleteHelloContainer on the end device under a user account, and then restarting the device.

If the user can sign in with a password, they can reset their PIN by selecting the I forgot my PIN link in the Settings app. Users can reset also their PIN from the lock screen by selecting the I forgot my PIN link on the PIN credential provider.

For on-premises deployments, devices must be connected to their on-premises network (domain controllers and/or certificate authority) to reset their PINs. Hybrid deployments can onboard their Azure tenant to use the Windows Hello for Business PIN reset service to reset their PINs. Non-destructive PIN reset works without access to the corporate network. Destructive PIN reset requires access to the corporate network. For more details about destructive and non-destructive PIN reset, see PIN reset.

Yes. Our simple PIN algorithm looks for and disallows any PIN that has a constant delta from one digit to the next. The algorithm counts the number of steps required to reach the next digit, overflowing at 10 ('zero'). So, for example:

• The PIN 1111 has a constant delta of (0,0,0), so it isn't allowed
• The PIN 1234 has a constant delta of (1,1,1), so it isn't allowed
• The PIN 1357 has a constant delta of (2,2,2), so it isn't allowed
• The PIN 9630 has a constant delta of (7,7,7), so it isn't allowed
• The PIN 1593 has a constant delta of (4,4,4), so it isn't allowed
• The PIN 7036 has a constant delta of (3,3,3), so it isn't allowed
• The PIN 1231 doesn't have a constant delta (1,1,2), so it's allowed
• The PIN 1872 doesn't have a constant delta (7,9,5), so it's allowed

This check prevents repeating numbers, sequential numbers, and simple patterns. It always results in a list of 100 disallowed PINs (independent of the PIN length). This algorithm doesn't apply to alphanumeric PINs.

To help Microsoft keep things working properly, to help detecting and preventing fraud, and to continue improving Windows Hello, diagnostic data about how people use Windows Hello is collected. For example:

• Data about whether people sign in with their face, iris, fingerprint, or PIN
• The number of times they use it
• Whether it works or not All this is valuable information that helps Microsoft building a better product. The data is pseudonymized, does not include biometric information, and is encrypted before it is transmitted to Microsoft. You can choose to stop sending diagnostic data to Microsoft at any time. Learn more about diagnostic data in Windows.

No. The movement away from passwords is accomplished by gradually reducing the use of the password. In situations where you can't authenticate by using biometrics, you need a fallback mechanism that isn't a password. The PIN is the fallback mechanism. Disabling or hiding the PIN credential provider will disable the use of biometrics.

This event is created when Windows Hello for Business is successfully created and registered with Azure Active Directory (Azure AD). Applications or services can trigger actions on this event. For example, a certificate provisioning service can listen to this event and trigger a certificate request. This is a normal condition and no further action is required.

The unauthorized user won't be able to utilize any biometric options and will have the only option to enter a PIN.

If the user attempts to unlock the device by entering random PINs, after three unsuccessful attempts the credential provider will display the following message: You've entered an incorrect PIN several times. To try again, enter A1B2C3 below. Upon entering the challenge phrase A1B2C3, the user will be granted one more opportunity to enter the PIN. If unsuccessful, the provider will be disabled, leaving the user with the only option to reboot the device. Following the reboot, the aforementioned pattern repeats.

If unsuccessful attempts continue, the device will enter a lockout state, lasting for 1 minute after the first reboot, 2 minutes after the fourth reboot, and 10 minutes after the fifth reboot. The duration of each lockout increases accordingly. This behavior is a result of the TPM 2.0 anti-hammering feature. For more information about the TPM anti-hammering feature, see TPM 2.0 anti-hammering.

Yes. You can use the on-premises Windows Hello for Business deployment and combine it with a third-party MFA provider that doesn't require internet connectivity to achieve an air-gapped Windows Hello for Business deployment.

The maximum number of supported enrollments on a single device is 10. This lets 10 users each enroll their face and up to 10 fingerprints. For devices with more than 10 users, or for users that sign-in to many devices (for example, a support technician), it's recommended the use of FIDO2 security keys.

No. If your organization is using Microsoft cloud services, then you must use a hybrid deployment model. On-premises deployments are exclusive to organizations who need more time before moving to the cloud and exclusively use Active Directory.

Review Azure AD Connect sync: Attributes synchronized to Azure Active Directory for a list of attributes that sync based on scenarios. The base scenarios that include Windows Hello for Business are the Windows 10 scenario and the Device writeback scenario. Your environment may include other attributes.

Yes, if you're using federated hybrid deployment, you can use any third-party that provides an AD FS MFA adapter. A list of third-party MFA adapters can be found here.

Windows Hello for Business works with any third-party federation servers that support the protocols used during the provisioning experience.

Windows Hello for Business is not designed to work with local accounts.

Read Windows Hello biometric requirements for more information.

Wearing a mask to enroll is a security concern because other users wearing a similar mask may be able to unlock your device. The product group is aware of this behavior and is investigating this article further. Remove a mask if you're wearing one when you enroll or unlock with Windows Hello face authentication. If your working environment doesn't allow you to remove a mask temporarily, consider un-enrolling from face authentication and only using PIN or fingerprint.

A user will be prompted to set up a Windows Hello for Business key on an Azure AD registered devices if the feature is enabled by policy. If the user has an existing Windows Hello container, the Windows Hello for Business key will be enrolled in that container and will be protected using existing gestures.

If a user has signed into their Azure AD registered device with Windows Hello, their Windows Hello for Business key will be used to authenticate the user's work identity when they try to use Azure AD resources. The Windows Hello for Business key meets Azure AD multifactor authentication (MFA) requirements and reduces the number of MFA prompts users will see when accessing resources.

It's possible to Azure AD register a domain joined device. If the domain joined device has a convenience PIN, sign in with the convenience PIN will no longer work. This configuration isn't supported by Windows Hello for Business.

For more information, please read Azure AD registered devices.

Windows Hello for Business is a feature of the Windows platform. At this time, Microsoft isn't developing clients for other platforms. However, Microsoft is open to third-parties who are interested in moving these platforms away from passwords. Interested third-parties can get more information by emailing whfbfeedback@microsoft.com.

No, Azure AD DS is a separately managed environment in Azure, and hybrid device registration with cloud Azure AD isn't available for it via Azure AD Connect. Hence, Windows Hello for Business doesn't work with Azure AD DS.

Windows Hello for Business is two-factor authentication based on the observed authentication factors of: something you have, something you know, and something that's part of you. Windows Hello for Business incorporates two of these factors: something you have (the user's private key protected by the device's security module) and something you know (your PIN). With the proper hardware, you can enhance the user experience by introducing biometrics. By using biometrics, you can replace the "something you know" authentication factor with the "something that is part of you" factor, with the assurances that users can fall back to the "something you know factor".

Both types of authentication provide the same security; one is not more secure than the other. The trust models of your deployment determine how you authenticate to Active Directory (on-premises). Both key trust and certificate trust use the same hardware-backed, two-factor credential. The difference between the two trust types is the issuance of end-entity certificates:

• The key trust model authenticates to Active Directory by using a raw key. Key trust doesn't require an enterprise-issued certificate, therefore you don't need to issue certificates to users (domain controller certificates are still needed)
• The certificate trust model authenticates to Active Directory by using a certificate. Therefore, you need to issue certificates to users. The certificate used in certificate trust uses the TPM-protected private key to request a certificate from your enterprise's issuing CA

Convenience PIN provides a simpler way to sign in to Windows than passwords, but it still uses a password for authentication. When the correct convenience PIN is provided to Windows, the password information is loaded from its cache and authenticates the user. Organizations using convenience PINs should move to Windows Hello for Business. New Windows deployments should deploy Windows Hello for Business and not convenience PINs.

No. While it's possible to set a convenience PIN on Azure AD joined and hybrid Azure AD joined devices, convenience PIN isn't supported for Azure AD user accounts (including synchronized identities). Convenience PIN is only supported for on-premises Active Directory users and local account users.

Windows Hello for Business is the modern, two-factor authentication for Windows. Microsoft will deprecate virtual smart cards in the near future. Customers using virtual smart cards are strongly encouraged to move to Windows Hello for Business. Microsoft will publish the deprecation date to ensure customers have adequate lead time to move to Windows Hello for Business. We recommend that new Windows deployments use Windows Hello for Business.

For a list of required URLs, see Microsoft 365 Common and Office Online.

If your environment uses Microsoft Intune, see Network endpoints for Microsoft Intune.

Yes, you can use an external Windows Hello compatible camera if a device has an internal Windows Hello camera. When both cameras are present, the external camera is used for face authentication. For more information, see IT tools to support Windows 10, version 21H1. If ESS is enabled, see Windows Hello Enhanced Sign-in Security.

Some laptops and tablets with keyboards that close may not use an external Windows Hello compatible camera or other Windows Hello compatible accessory when the computer is docked with the lid closed. The issue has been addressed in Windows 11, version 22H2.

Windows Hello for Business credentials need access to device state, which is not available in private browser mode or incognito mode. Hence it can't be used in private browser or Incognito mode.

You can use multifactor unlock to require users to provide an extra factor to unlock their device. Authentication remains two-factor, but another factor is required before Windows allows the user to reach the desktop. To learn more, see Multifactor Unlock.

Windows Hello for Business cloud Kerberos trust is a trust model that enables Windows Hello for Business deployment using the infrastructure introduced for supporting security key sign-in on Hybrid Azure AD-joined devices and on-premises resource access on Azure AD Joined devices. Cloud Kerberos trust is the preferred deployment model if you do not need to support certificate authentication scenarios. For more information, see cloud Kerberos trust deployment.

This feature doesn't work in a pure on-premises AD domain services environment.

Windows Hello for Business cloud Kerberos trust looks for a writeable DC to exchange the partial TGT. As long as you have at least one writeable DC per site, login with cloud Kerberos trust will work.

Windows Hello for Business cloud Kerberos trust requires line of sight to a domain controller when:

• a user signs-in for the first time or unlocks with Windows Hello for Business after provisioning
• attempting to access on-premises resources secured by Active Directory

Windows Hello for Business cloud Kerberos trust can't be used as a supplied credential with RDP/VDI. Similar to key trust, cloud Kerberos trust can be used for RDP with Remote Credential Guard or if a certificate is enrolled into Windows Hello for Business for this purpose.

No, only the number necessary to handle the load from all cloud Kerberos trust devices.

In a hybrid deployment, a user's public key must sync from Azure AD to AD before it can be used to authenticate against a domain controller. This sync is handled by Azure AD Connect and will occur during a normal sync cycle.

Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) doesn't currently support using key-based authentication and self-signed certificates as supplied credentials. However, you can deploy certificates in the key trust model to enable RDP. For more information, see Deploying certificates to key trust users to enable RDP. In addition, Windows Hello for Business key trust can be also used with RDP with Remote Credential Guard without deploying certificates.